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Abstract1
Infants imitate behavior flexibly. Depending on the circumstances, they2
copy both actions and their effects or only reproduce the demonstrator’s in-3
tended goals. In view of this selective imitation, infants have been called4
rational imitators. The ability to selectively and adaptively imitate behavior5
would be a beneficial capacity for robots. Indeed, selecting what to imitate is6
one of the outstanding unsolved problems in the field of robotic imitation. In7
this paper, we first present a formalized model of rational imitation suited for8
robotic applications. Next, we test and demonstrate it using two humanoid9
robots.10
1 Introduction11
Imitation is a very important form of social learning in humans and has been sug-12
gested to underlie human cumulative culture (Legare and Nielsen, 2015; Tomasello,13
2009). In keeping with its importance in human development, the ability to im-14
itate emerges early in human infants. From their second year on, infants can15
imitate actions and their intended goals from demonstrators (e.g., Gariépy et al.,16
2014; Jones, 2009). Critically, infants imitate the demonstrated actions and their17
effects in a flexible way. Depending on the circumstances, they copy both actions18
and effects or only reproduce intended goals. In view of this selective imitation,19
infants have been called rational imitators (Gergely et al., 2002).20
In a landmark paper, Meltzoff (1988) showed that 14-month-old children switch21
on a light by bending over and touching it with their head, if they have seen an ex-22
perimenter do so. Later studies showed that if the experimenter’s hands are occu-23
pied children tend to switch on the light using their hands (Gergely et al., 2002).24
The percentage of copied head-touch actions also declines when the demonstra-25
tor’s hands are physically restrained (Zmyj et al., 2009; Gellén and Buttelmann,26
2017). Apparently, when the experimenter’s hand are occupied or restrained, the27
children deem the head touch to be irrelevant to the outcome. These results have28
been replicated by Beisert et al. (2012) and Paulus et al. (2011), albeit with a29
different interpretation.30
1
Another aspect of rational imitation was demonstrated in a study by Carpen-31
ter et al. (2005). A demonstrator moved a toy mouse to a target position either32
using a sliding or hopping motion. If a toy house was present at the goal location,33
children were less likely to copy the motion than if no house was present. The34
authors assumed that the presence of the house induced the children to adopt the35
goal of placing the mouse in the house whilst disregarding the demonstrated mo-36
tion. In the absence of the toy house, the children presumably perceived motions37
as being the goal, and therefore, as relevant.38
In summary, young children (act as if they) are able to distinguish between39
relevant and irrelevant aspects of demonstrated behaviour. They seem to copy40
the actions more often if relevant for attaining the goal. In particular, they seem41
to (1) take into account the constraints of the demonstrator and (2) discount ac-42
tions in favour of goals.43
Since the advent of robotics, imitation has been suggested as a method for44
learning in robots. Billard et al. (2008) list two advantages of imitation learning.45
First, learning from a demonstrator greatly simplifies the search solutions to46
sensorimotor problems, which are typically hard. In addition, imitating robots47
would be programmable by lay-persons using the same methods they employ to48
teach other people. Robotic imitation faces a number of challenges (Dautenhahn49
and Nehaniv, 2002). One of the most fundamental issues is determining what to50
imitate (Carpenter and Call, 2006; Breazeal and Scassellati, 2002). Among other51
aspects, this involves determining the relevant parts of a demonstrated action52
and only copying those. Hence, the selective and rational imitation shown by53
children would be a beneficial capacity for robots (Gergely, 2003). Unfortunately,54
in spite of the considerable body of experimental data, the cognitive mechanisms55
underlying rational imitation remain elusive. In particular, no satisfactory and56
computationally explicit model of rational imitation in infants is available.57
Initially, authors explained the results of experiments by assuming that in-58
fants reason teleologically about the goals and actions demonstrated (See Zmyj59
and Buttelmann, 2014, for references). Children are assumed to infer that (1) the60
demonstrator uses his or her head to switch on the lamp because his or her hands61
are constrained and (2), as such, the head touch is not necessary to successfully62
switch on the lamp. Therefore, when asked to switch on the lamp, the infant63
uses his or her hands. In contrast, when the demonstrator’s hands are free, the64
infants are assumed to reason that the head touch is instrumental in obtaining65
the goal.66
More recently, competing accounts have been advanced (See also Gellén and67
Buttelmann, 2017, for an overview). In particular, it has been proposed that68
many experimental results can be explained by differences in the difficulty for69
the infants to copy the demonstrator’s actions (Zmyj and Buttelmann, 2014). Ac-70
cording to this account, bending forward to touch a lamp with restrained hands71
is more difficult than doing so with free hands available to support the body.72
As such, an increased difficulty in exactly copying the demonstrated motion –73
termed a lack of ‘motor resonance’ (Paulus et al., 2011) – is assumed to reduce74
the extent to which infants copy a demonstrated action. Beisert et al. (2012) ad-75
vanced yet another account of rational imitation in infants. These authors have76
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claimed that attentional processes can fully explain selective imitation.77
While it is undoubtedly (and unsurprisingly) true that both the feasibility78
of the demonstrated actions and attentional processes determine the fidelity of79
action copying, neither account fully accommodates the experimental findings80
(Zmyj and Buttelmann, 2014). For example, even in the absence of obvious dif-81
ferences in action difficulty, 12-month old infants copy a model with constrained82
hands less often (Zmyj et al., 2009). In addition, 12-month old – but not 9-month83
old – infants ignored the head touch action of a model with hands fixed to the ta-84
ble (Zmyj et al., 2009). It is difficult to see how infants would be susceptible to ‘a85
lack of motor resonance’ at 12 months but not at 9 months. Likewise, attentional86
mechanisms cannot explain effects across conditions that do not seem to recruit87
different levels of attention (Paulus et al., 2013; Kolling et al., 2014).88
While the motor resonance and attention theories fall short in accommodat-89
ing for some data, the reasoning hypothesis suffers mainly from being under-90
specified – although it can be noted that the idea of ‘motor resonance’ is less than91
fully specified either (Zmyj and Buttelmann, 2014). As a result, the reasoning ac-92
count can be made to accommodate most findings post facto. For example, Paulus93
et al. (2011) conducted an experiment to distinguish between the reasoning ac-94
count and the motor resonance model. They concluded that findings were more95
in line with the predictions of the motor resonance model. However, it is unclear96
whether the predictions these authors derive for the teleological reasoning ac-97
count are the only interpretation possible (See Zmyj and Buttelmann (2014) for98
a similar remark).99
In the absence of a complete and computationally explicit model, we propose100
a novel model for rational imitation, i.c. the Cost Difference Model (CDM). In101
particular, we aim for a model that supports rational imitation in robots. In102
contrast to the accounts discussed above – and in accord with our goal to exploit103
rational imitation to optimize the imitation behaviour in robots – we depart from104
a normative analysis of imitation learning. That is, we postulate the desirable105
properties of rational imitation and build a model satisfying these requirements.106
2 The Cost Difference Model107
2.1 Rationale108
In agreement with current views on its adaptive value (e.g., Laland, 2004; Erbas109
et al., 2013), we propose that imitation is a method for acquiring better action110
policies (Argall et al., 2009). Action policies can be thought of as a series of sub-111
goals that lead towards attaining the final goal. For example, an action policy for112
making spaghetti (final goal) are the steps (subgoals) as set out in the recipe.113
Assuming that imitation is a learning strategy for adopting better action poli-114
cies for satisfying goals, imitation has the possible advantage of being a cheaper115
(less risky) route to policy learning than individual, asocial learning. Neverthe-116
less, indiscriminately copying behaviour is unlikely to result in better policies117
(Laland, 2004). Ideally, agents should only copy behaviour when an observed118
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policy is better than the current existing action policy. Initially, we can assume119
better policies to be those requiring less energy. However, other optimization120
criteria could be imagined, including risk and time. In biological agents, better121
action policies are those ultimately resulting in increased fitness.122
In this light, experimental findings on imitation in infants are somewhat puz-123
zling. Infants copy demonstrated head touches in spite of clearly being able to124
switch on the light using their hands (which seems to be a better policy). In-125
deed, in control conditions, children spontaneously switch on the light using their126
hands. Moreover, even when infants eventually copy the head touch, most often127
they switch on the light using their hands first (Paulus et al., 2013, 2011; Gergely,128
2003). So why do children copy the ineffective head touch policy given they have129
an alternative policy that seems more efficient?130
In our view, this discrepancy can be explained by assuming that an agent131
observing a demonstrated action policy has only limited knowledge about its en-132
ergetic cost. The agent might be able to estimate the energy requirement of the133
demonstrated policy, for example, using its own action planner (or internal sim-134
ulation, Hesslow (2002, 2012)). However, this will yield an approximate estimate135
at best – especially when the demonstrated policy includes unfamiliar actions. In136
addition, the agent can estimate or retrieve the cost of its existing action policy137
and compare this to the estimated value of the demonstrated action policy. In138
agreement with this assumption, infants expect demonstrators to minimize the139
costs of actions (Liu and Spelke, 2017, and references therein). Moreover, actions140
that violate this assumptions recruit more attention from the infants.141
Theoretically, the agent should reject the demonstrated policy whenever its142
cost is higher than that of the existing policy. However, the cost of the demon-143
strated policy is not directly accessible and is only an estimate. As such, seeing144
someone executing a costly action policy might indicate that the estimated cost145
is inaccurate. If so, it would be reasonable to actually execute the demonstrated146
policy and obtain a corrected estimate of its cost. Indeed, the potential long-term147
gain of chancing on an innovative policy would generally outweigh the cost of148
testing out the action.149
In summary, we propose that the rational imitation observed in infants is the150
overt outcome of uncertainty about the cost of the demonstrated action policy.151
This is, when copying an action policy they are exploring its cost by physically152
executing it. This overt action will result in a better estimate of its real cost.153
Critically, our hypothesis predicts that explorative copying of actions should oc-154
cur more often if the demonstrator is deemed trustworthy (Laland, 2004; Van-155
derelst et al., 2009). This is corroborated in experiments. Infants more often156
copy ineffective behaviour from trusted (Zmyj et al., 2010; Poulin-Dubois et al.,157
2011) or familiar (Beisert et al., 2012) demonstrators. In addition, the notion of158
imitation as a method for exploring an action’s cost is supported by the finding159
(mentioned above) that, even when infants eventually copy head touches, most160
often they switch on the light using their hands first. Hence, when copying the161
head touches, they actually perform both actions most of the time (Paulus et al.,162
2013, 2011; Gergely, 2003). This would allow them to directly compare the cost of163
both action policies. Moreover, our account predicts that children should have a164
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tendency to over-imitate irrelevant actions as they result in an unexpected high165
cost estimate triggering explorative imitation of the demonstrated actions. This166
has been confirmed in a series of experiments (Lyons et al., 2007; Keupp et al.,167
2013). In agreement with our thesis, infants seem to assume that demonstra-168
tors will minimize the costs of their actions. When demonstrators fail to do so,169
this recruits increased levels of attention (Liu and Spelke, 2017) which could the170
mechanism that leads to increased imitation (or over-imitation).171
Finally, it should be pointed out that our functional description of rational172
imitation suggests similar adaptive advantages are to be gained by other species.173
As such, it is interesting that both chimpanzees (Buttelmann et al., 2007) and174
dogs (Range et al., 2007) have found to be selective imitators in much the same175
way as human infants.176
Having outlined a functional account of rational imitation, we proceed to de-177
scribe the computations we assume to underlie the selection of action policies for178
imitation. We propose this proceeds in three steps: (1) parsing the continuous179
stream of sensory input, (2) solving the correspondence problem, (3) comparing180
the costs of the existing and the demonstrated action policies.181
2.2 Formalization182
2.2.1 Parsing behaviour183
Behaviour consists of dynamic and continuous motions, and their effects. Hence,184
the first challenge for an imitating agent is parsing this stream of sensory input185
into meaningful chunks of actions and resulting effects. Indeed, young infants186
have been shown to parse behaviour into goal oriented chunks (e.g., Baldwin187
et al., 2001). In principle, they might use a wealth of task-related knowledge188
to solve this problem. However, they could also exploit low-level sensory cues189
signalling the boundaries between behavioural units, especially in early develop-190
mental stages (Baldwin et al., 2001). Indeed, adults will often explicitly capture191
the child’s attention before initiating a demonstration. Likewise, they use verbal192
cues to signal the action has been completed. Verbal cues are commonly used193
in experimental investigations of imitation to denote the start and ending of a194
demonstration (e.g., Paulus et al., 2011; Schwier et al., 2006; Zmyj et al., 2009).195
In addition, more basic sensory cues could be salient changes in visual and audi-196
tory input or object motion.197
In our experiments, we assume the robot can use either task-related knowl-198
edge or low-level sensory cues to parse the behaviour of a demonstrator and do199
not model this step explicitly.200
2.2.2 Solving the correspondence problem201
The second computational step concerns solving the correspondence problem.202
That is, the module converts the observed behaviour into the coordinate sys-203
tem of the observer. The correspondence problem is far from trivial (Nehaniv204
and Dautenhahn, 2001), in particular when the body plan of the demonstrator205
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and observer are different. Indeed, errors made in solving the correspondence206
problem are assumed to be an important bottleneck preventing successful infant207
imitation (Gattis et al., 2002). However, in the field of robotics, a substantial208
amount of research has resulted in a number of methods for solving this problem209
(e.g., Argall et al., 2009; Schaal et al., 2003; Nehaniv, 2007). Hence, in this pa-210
per, we assume the problem can possibly be solved using the methods proposed211
earlier. The output of this computational step, a sequence of states in the ob-212
server’s coordinate system, will be denoted by as ~ot with t indexing the time,213
with t= [0,T].214
2.2.3 Inferring the demonstrator’s policy215
In order to model imitation based on the assumptions introduced above, we need216
to propose a mechanism that allows agents to infer the demonstrated action pol-217
icy from the observed sequence of states ~ot. This is, the imitator needs to infer218
from ~ot which intermediate goals the demonstrator satisfies en route to the final219
goal. To the best of our knowledge, no account of the method used by infants to220
select relevant subgoals from observed actions is available. Hence, in what fol-221
lows, we present an approach that is suitable for the current robotic experiments.222
It should be understood that this method is a first approach and could be refined223
in further work to suit other contexts.224
In more formal terms, inferring the demonstrator’s action policy can be thought225
of as selecting the minimal number of intermediate states from~ot required to ex-226
plain the observed behaviour ~ot. This set of minimal required states, denoted as227
~os, are assumed to be the subgoals of the demonstrator. Below, we explain our228
current approach to selecting this minimal set of states ~os.229
We suggest the robot should select an iteratively expanding set of states230
~os = {o0 . . .on . . .oT } from the observed states ~ot. For each set ~os, the robot uses231
its own action planner to compute an action sequence ~at leading from o0 to oT232
through the intermittent states on in ~os. In planning the action sequence ~at,233
the robot should take into account the physical constraints C experienced by the234
demonstrator. Hence, the action sequence ~at is the action plan the robot would235
come up with itself (1) if it were in the same situation as the demonstrator and (2)236
wanted to attain each of the selected subgoals in ~os. As such, the notation for the237
planned action sequence, ~at, should be considered as shorthand for ~at = f (~os,C)238
indicating that the planned action sequence is a function of (1) the currently239
selected action states ~os and (2) the physical constraints C. In terms of the be-240
havioural experiments discussed above, physical constraints could include the241
fact that the demonstrator’s hands are occupied (e.g. as in Gergely et al., 2002).242
For each set of selected states ~os and resulting action sequence ~at, the imita-243
tor estimates the cost of ~at. We tentatively suggest the cost is expressed in terms244
of energy expenditure. The estimated energetic cost Eˆ(~at) is compared with the245
estimated cost of the demonstrated action sequence Eˆ(~ot) calculating the cost246
difference ∆E as,247
∆E = |Eˆ(~ot)− Eˆ(~at)| ·S(~ot) (1)
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In equation 1, the parameter S(ot) indicates the saliency of the demonstrated248
state ~ot. This weighing allows discounting part of the demonstrated action se-249
quence~ot in favour of salient action outcomes. The saliency of (part of) a demon-250
stration could be computed using existing approaches to visual saliency meth-251
ods developed in the field of human-machine interaction (e.g. Scassellati, 2002;252
He et al., 2014). In the experiments reported in the current paper, we do not253
vary this parameter and fix it at a value of 1. However, experimental evidence254
strongly suggests saliency is an important factor (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2005; Liu255
and Spelke, 2017) and we plan to expand the model in this direction.256
At first, the set of selected states~os only contains the initial and final observed257
states, i.e.,~os = {o0,oT }. However, the set is iteratively expanded by adding more258
intermediate states. Therefore, the set of selected states ~os will eventually ap-259
proach the observed action sequence ~ot. In consequence, ∆E approaches zero as260
the set~os is expanded. When the value of ∆E is below a certain threshold τE , ex-261
panding ~os is terminated and the current set ~os (with the exception of the initial262
state o0) is taken to contain the subgoals in the observed behaviour. The set ~os263
contains the minimum number of subgoals that are required to explain the (cost264
of the) observed behaviour ~ot. Also, notice that the iterative process implies that265
when ∆E(~os = {o0,oT })< τE , the imitator will simply plan an action sequence to266
attain the final state demonstrated – hence, no imitation of any intermediate goal267
will take place. In this case, the imitator assumes that the observed behaviour~ot268
can be inadequately explained by assuming the demonstrator is simply attempt-269
ing to reach the final goal. No subgoals need to be assumed.270
Obviously, expanding the set ~os can be done in many ways. Here, we pro-271
pose that on each iteration additional states are selected at time instances inter-272
mediate between the currently selected states. At first, only two states will be273
selected,274
~os = {o0,oT }. (2)
On the next iteration, an additional state in between these two will be added:275
~os = {o0,o T
2
,oT }. Next, the set will be expanded to ~os = {o0,o T
4
,o T
2
,o 3T
4
,oT }. In276
other words, at the nth iteration the length of ~os is given by |~os| = 1+2n−1.277
In equation 1, ~at denotes the action sequence planned to attain the selected278
states ~ot. Hence, we assume that the agent can plan an action sequence passing279
through a number of selected goal states. In addition, we assume that the agent280
can plan this taking into account the physical constraints C of the demonstra-281
tor. This assumption represents the most challenging cognitive ability supposed282
under our model. However, evidence suggests that infants are capable of plan-283
ning actions under physical constraints (Upshaw and Sommerville, 2015; Claxton284
et al., 2003).285
Figure 1 illustrates the process outlined above. Figure 1b depicts a hypo-286
thetical path followed by a demonstrator (depicted as a black line) from start to287
goal. Observing this path, an imitator iteratively selects an increasing number of288
states (here: n = 2, 3 and 4, respectively) from the demonstrated path. Selecting289
only the start and goal position (fig. 1c) leads to a large cost difference∆E (fig. 1f).290
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Figure 1: Illustration of the process of selecting states ~os of the demonstrated
action sequence ~ot. (a) flow chart depicting the process of selecting ~os. (b) The
hypothetical path taken by a demonstrator (black line) from start to goal. Notice
the demonstrated path consists of both an unnecessary curve (first) and neces-
sary curve (to negotiate the black obstacle). (d) This panel illustrates the planned
path ~at for ~os containing only the initial state and final state. Notice that this
results in a discrepancy between the paths ~at and ~ot. In particular, the first
curve is not included in ~at. This will result in a value for ∆E that is larger than
τE . Hence, additional states will be added to ~os. This is illustrated in panels
d-e where ~os contains 3 and 4 selected states respectively. By selecting a single
additional state in panel d, the match between paths ~at and ~ot increases (and
∆E < τE , panel f). At this point, the iterative expansion of ~os is terminated and
adding further states does not markedly decrease ∆E (panels e and f). Finally,
panel g depicts the path the imitator would follow (note, it starts from a different
location than the demonstrator). Omitting state o0 from ~os, it goes to oT via o1,
thereby imitating the unnecessary (and energetically demanding) detour shown
by the demonstrator.
8
The reason is that the planned action ~at does not include the deviation present291
in the demonstrator’s path. However, by including an additional third state (fig.292
1d), the imitator’s planned action sequence ~at better matches the demonstrated293
path (and energetic cost). Adding more states does not improve the match (fig. 1294
e and f). Hence, the imitator will copy the three states (depicted in fig. 1d). The295
imitated path is shown in fig. 1g.296
2.3 Accounting for experimental data297
In this section, we explain how the CDM can account for the relevant findings in298
the literature on rational imitation in human infants. In particular, we discuss299
the results of Carpenter et al. (2005) mentioned above because these allow us to300
illustrate all aspects of the CDM. The relevant findings of these authors are de-301
picted in figure 2. To recapitulate, these authors reported (among other results)302
that 18-month old children were most prone to copy the actions demonstrated by303
an experimenter when a toy mouse was moved across a table top using a hopping304
motion (Figure 2a, condition 1). They copied the action less faithfully when the305
mouse was slid across the table (Figure 2a, condition 2) and even less so when a306
small toy house was present at the final location (Figure 2a, condition 3). Finally,307
moving the mouse to the toy house using a hopping motion was more likely to308
be copied (Figure 2a, condition 4) than when it was moved in a sliding motion309
(Figure 2a, condition 3).310
First, the CDM accounts for the increased action copying associated with the311
hopping motion with respect to the sliding motion (conditions 1 and 3 vs. 2 and312
4) by assuming that the former is more energetically demanding. In other words,313
the hopping motion is assumed to result in a large value for the first term in314
equation 1 if not faithfully modelled using sufficient number of states ~ot. Hence,315
the CDM predict the hopping motion should be more faithfully copied.316
Second, the CDM can account for the reduction in copying due to the intro-317
duction of the house (conditions 1 and 2 vs. 3 and 4) in terms of the saliency318
parameter, S(ot). We assume that the event of inserting the toy into the house is319
more salient than the preceding actions. Hence, the saliency function S(ot) dis-320
counts the preceding action. In absence of the house, no such discounting occurs321
(see fig. 2b).322
Finally, we briefly discuss how the CDM accommodates the experimental re-323
sults using the popular head touch paradigm. The model assumes that whenever324
a demonstrator with free hands performs a head touch, the first term of equation325
1 will be large. Indeed, the energetic demand of the head touch will be compared326
with that of a simple hand touch. In contrast, when the demonstrator’s hands are327
occupied Gergely et al. (2002), the infant is assumed to plan an action taking into328
account these constraints (remember that ~at in equation 1 should be regarded as329
shorthand for ~at = f (~os,C) with C representing the physical constraints of the330
demonstrator). We assume that this will result in infants covertly planning a331
head-touch themselves. As such, this will result in lower values for the first term332
of equation 1 and, therefore, a lower degree of action copying. It could be objected333
that is unlikely that children come up with a head touch as a way of dealing334
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Figure 2: (a) Data from Carpenter et al. (2005). The statistical tests are our post-
hoc tests, i.c., t-tests based on the reported means and standard deviations. (b)
Examples of assumed salience functions, S(ot). See text for details.
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with the constraints. However, a small percentage of infants who have not been335
shown the head touch still choose to touch the lamp with their heads (Paulus336
et al., 2013), especially younger infants (Zmyj et al., 2009). Hence, it is not be-337
yond plausibility that the apparatus used in these experiments spontaneously338
elicits head pushing as a solution to deal with the constraint of occupied hands.339
Incidentally, perceiving the lamp being switched might induce discounting the340
preceding action through the saliency. However, this would not result in head341
touch being ignored as the end state in these experiments involves the experi-342
menter touching the lamp with her head. Hence, even if the saliency parameter343
results in only the final state of the demonstration to be copied, the head touch344
will still be imitated.345
In contrast to an account based on attentional processes (Beisert et al., 2012),346
the CDM does not require conditions to recruit different levels of attention for347
rational imitation to occur (Paulus et al., 2013; Kolling et al., 2014). However, at-348
tentional processes can be accounted for using the term S(~ot) (eq. 1). Our model349
also differs in its predictions with the ‘motor resonance’ account of rational imi-350
tation (Paulus et al., 2011). As mentioned, 12-month old – but not 9-month old –351
infants have been shown to ignore the head touch action of a model with hands352
fixed to the table (Zmyj et al., 2009). Our model could explain these findings by353
assuming that 12-month olds are better at accounting for a model’s constraints.354
In contrast, the motor resonance account would need to account for this by as-355
suming that infants are more susceptible to ‘a lack of motor resonance’ at 12356
months than at 9 months. This would imply that infants are less good at copying357
motor behavior at 12 months than at 9 months.358
3 Methods359
We used two NAO humanoid robots (Aldebaran) in this study, a blue and a red360
version. The blue robot was assigned the role of the demonstrator. The red robot361
was assigned the role of the imitator. Experiments were carried out in a 3 by362
2.5 m arena. An overhead 3D tracking system (Vicon) consisting of 4 cameras363
was used to monitor the position and orientation of the robots at a rate of 30 Hz.364
The robots were equipped with a clip-on helmet fitted with a number of reflective365
beads used by the tracking system to localize the robots. In addition to the robots,366
the arena contained three small tables each with a unique pattern of reflective367
beads. These served as obstacles and a target position.368
The custom-written Python software controlling the robots implemented a369
path planning algorithm (figure 7). This algorithm overlaid the arena with a370
rectangular graph with nodes spaced 10 cm apart (Schult and Swart, 2008).371
Nodes closer than 0.5 m to an obstacle were removed from the graph. A path372
between the current position of a robot and the desired goal location was planned373
by finding the shortest path of connected nodes between the node closest to the374
robot’s current position and the node closest to the goal position. By removing375
the nodes closer than 0.5 m to an obstacle, the path planning algorithm ensured376
the robots steered well clear of obstacles. In the current paper, the estimated en-377
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ergetic costs Eˆ(~ot) and Eˆ(~at) are approximated by the length of the planned and378
observed paths, respectively. For robots moving at a constant speed, this is a fair379
approximation.380
4 Experiment 1: Modelling Experimental Find-381
ings382
Figure 3 illustrates the four conditions of experiment 1. In the first condition,383
the demonstrator is not hampered by obstacles. Hence, it moves towards the goal384
position using a direct path (fig. 3a). In the second condition (fig. 3b), the demon-385
strator could approach the goal using a direct path. However, the demonstrator386
approaches the goal by a detour. In the third condition, obstacles between the387
demonstrator and the goal prevent a direct path. The path planning algorithm388
yields a path circumventing the obstacles (fig. 3c). Finally, in the fourth condition389
(fig. 3d), the demonstrator was sent to the goal by the same path as in condition 2.390
Hence, in condition 4, the detour was not planned by the path planner but explic-391
itly programmed. Condition 3 and 4 should lead to the same outcome. However,392
methodologically, condition 4 confirms that differences between conditions 1 & 2393
and 2 & 3 are not due to the way the motion of the demonstrator is planned. In394
other words, condition 4 demonstrates that the (internal) intention of the demon-395
strator is not taken into account by the imitator.396
The critical conditions, in modelling the experimental results regarding ratio-397
nal imitation in infants (e.g., Gergely et al., 2002; Meltzoff, 1988), are conditions398
2 and 3. In both conditions, the demonstrator does not take the direct path to399
the goal. The difference between these conditions, however, is the presence of an400
obstacle in condition 3. In this condition, the obstacle forces the demonstrator to401
take the longer path. This is analogous to a demonstrator switching on the lamp402
with her head when her hands are occupied in the sense that the constraints403
of the situation necessitate the less direct (and energetically inefficient) mode of404
operation. Critically, the CDM assumes that the robot (infant) plans an indirect405
path (head touch) to cope with the constraints introduced by the obstacle (occu-406
pied hands). Hence, the robot (infant) is predicted not to imitate the indirect407
path (head touch). In contrast, in condition 2, given no obstacle (analogous to the408
free hands condition in behavioural experiments) the imitator will plan a direct409
path (a hand touch). The planned direct path (head touch) is assumed to differ410
sufficiently (in terms of energy expenditure) from the demonstrated indirect path411
(head touch) to incur imitation.412
Figure 4 depicts the results of experiment 1. In condition 1, the demonstrator413
takes the direct route to the goal position (fig 4a). Calculating ∆E for~ot with two414
states results in a value lower than τE (fig 4e and fig. 6). Hence, imitator only415
retains the final goal oT as policy. Therefore, the imitator proceeds directly to the416
goal, using a direct path (fig 4i).417
In condition 2, the demonstrator takes a detour to the goal, in spite of a direct418
path being possible (fig 4b). Calculating ∆E for ~ot with two states results in a419
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a b
c d
Figure 3: Illustration of the four conditions in experiment 1. The blue robot is the
demonstrator. The red robot is the imitator. The green arrows depict the path
taken by the demonstrator. Note that in panel c the demonstrator cannot pass
between the two round obstacles. Details in text.
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Figure 4: Results of experiment 1. Panels a-d: traces of the paths taken by the
demonstrator for conditions 1-4, respectively. The black circles denote the posi-
tion of two obstacles. Panels e-h depict the process of iteratively expanding~ot. In
red, the planned path~at is shown for~os with two states, i.e.,~ot = {o0,oT }. In blue,
the planned path ~at is shown for ~os with three states, i.e., ~os = {o0,oT/2,oT }. In
conditions 1,3 & 4, the red path ~at matches the demonstrated path ~ot well. This
is, ∆E < τE . In condition 2 red path ~at does not match the demonstrated path ~ot
(∆E > τE). In contrast, the blue path ~at satisfies the requirement ∆E < τE . Here
only the resulting paths ~at for |~os| equal to 2 and 3 are shown. However, the ~at
for |~os| equal to 5, 9 and 17 were also evaluated. Their resulting weighted cost
differences ∆E are plotted in figure 6. Panels i-l depict the imitated behaviour for
each of the four conditions. Notice that the imitator does not start from the same
position as the demonstrator. In conditions 1, 3 & 4, the imitator proceeds to the
goal (i.e., oT ) by a direct path. In condition 2, the set of selected states contains
three states. Hence, the imitator proceeds to oT via an intermediate state, i.e.,
o0 → oT/2 → oT .
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value higher than τE (fig 4f and fig. 6). In contrast, calculating ∆E for ~ot with420
three states results in a value lower than τE (fig 4f and fig. 6). Hence, the policy421
copied will include an additional sub goal en route to the goal. The imitator422
proceeds to this intermediate goal before going to the final goal (fig 4j). The423
blue path ~at, based on ~os with three states, in fig. 4e satisfies the requirement424
∆E < τE . Hence, the policy copied will include an additional subgoal en route to425
the goal. The imitator proceeds to this intermediate goal before going to the final426
goal (fig. 4h).427
In conditions 3 & 4, the demonstrator reaches the goal by a detour fig 4c & d).428
However, the presence of an obstacle makes this necessary. Indeed, the planned429
path ~at from o0 to oT will also contain this detour. As such, the value of ∆E430
will be small, even for ~os = {o0,oT } (fig 4g & h and fig. 6). As such, the imitator431
proceeds directly to the final goal (fig 4k & l).432
In condition 3, the demonstrator reaches the goal via a detour fig. 4c). How-433
ever, the presence of an obstacle makes this necessary. Indeed, the path ~at434
planned by the imitator from o0 to oT (i.e. |~os| = 2) will also contain this de-435
tour. As such, the value of ∆E will be small, even for |~os| = 2 (fig. 4f and j). The436
red path ~at for |~os| = 2 (fig. 4f) matches the demonstrated path ~ot sufficiently.437
As a result, the imitator proceeds directly to the final goal (fig. 4i), as it did in438
condition 1.439
Experiment 1 was aimed at modelling the basic findings of the behavioural ex-440
periments regarding rational imitation in infants (Meltzoff, 1988; Gergely et al.,441
2002; Zmyj et al., 2009; Beisert et al., 2012; Paulus et al., 2011). As mentioned442
above, these authors showed that children copy the head-touch demonstrated by443
adults only if the adult’s hands were unrestricted. In our robot experiments, the444
imitator only copied the demonstrated detour if the demonstrator was not forced445
to take this detour by the obstacles (Condition 2, fig. 4b, e and h). In contrast,446
when the demonstrator took the same path – but was forced to do so on account447
of an obstacle – the imitator disregarded the detour (Condition 3, fig. 4c, f and i).448
As such, conditions 2 and 3 reveal our robots modelling the behaviour of infants449
in the behavioural experiments discussed above.450
5 Experiment 2: Learning Better Policies451
In our view, the behavioural experiments concerning rational imitation cited452
above can be considered as cases of pathological imitation (Winfield and Erbas,453
2011). That is, the behavioural experiments are set up to induce imitation in454
spite of the behaviour being inefficient, i.e., the head touch is a less efficient way455
of switching on the light than a hand touch. The experiments of Lyons et al.456
(2007) and Keupp et al. (2013) illustrate how easily children can be tricked into457
imitating inefficient behaviour. In these experiments, the demonstrating adult458
exhibited a range of action irrelevant to attain a given goal. Nevertheless, the459
infants tended to copy these actions – even when explicitly instructed not to copy460
any ‘silly’ behaviour. However, when not experimentally controlled, adults’ be-461
haviour can generally be assumed to be more efficient or more adaptive than462
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Figure 5: Results of experiment 2. The paths of both the imitator (red paths) and
demonstrator (blue paths) for three trials are plotted.The grids in the background
of panels a-c represent the graph used in path planning by the imitator (panels
a & c) and the demonstrator (panel b). Panel a: the initial policy of the imitator
in reaching the goal position involves a detour. Part of the graph used by the
imitator for path planning has been taken out (the hatched region). Panel b: the
demonstrator approaches the goal in a straight line (its path planning graph has
not been lesioned). Panel c: the imitator, based on observing the demonstrator’s
policy, adopts a more efficient policy. Panel d: cost difference ∆E as a function of
the number of states in ~os averaged over the three trials
that of infants. Under these conditions, as will be shown below, the mechanism463
proposed above for selecting policies for imitation is adaptive.464
In this section of the paper, we present a robotic experiment showing that the465
CDM can also select more efficient policies if these are observed in a demonstra-466
tor. Indeed, by virtue of equation 1, the CDM can select policies for explorative467
imitation that are less costly than the current policy. The current policy of the468
robot amounts to the planned route~at for~os with only two states (o0 and oT ). For469
|~os| = 2, the robot will generate a plan reaching the end goal without taking into470
account the demonstrated behaviour. If the observed policy~ot is significantly less471
costly than the currently held policy, ∆E will be larger than τE (by virtue of the472
absolute value operator in equation 1). This will trigger the expansion of the set473
of intermediate goals ~os until ∆E is smaller than τE .474
In experiment 2, the imitator starts with a policy that is clearly not optimal.475
When going from the start position to the goal, the imitator takes an unnecessary476
detour (fig. 5a). This detour is caused by the imitator’s path planning algorithm477
not considering the locations in the hatched area (fig. 5a). In effect, the hatched478
area is not part of the search space considered by the path planning algorithm.479
In contrast, panel b of figure 5 shows the demonstrator moving in a straight480
line from start to goal – as depicted in this panel, the whole arena is part of481
the demonstrator’s search space. As such, the demonstrator can find a shorter482
path to the goal. Considering the observed behaviour ~ot, the imitator iteratively483
expands a set of selected states ~os from the demonstrated states ~ot. Each state484
os in ~os corresponds to a position of the demonstrator in the arena. By adding485
states os to ~os the imitator effectively expands its path planning search space.486
Iteratively expanding the set of selected states ~os will eventually lead to filling487
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in the part of the search space that was initially not available to the imitator488
(in panel a). Indeed, in effect, a corridor between start and goal position is built489
(figure 5c). When this corridor is established the value ∆E < τE (at |~os| = 5, panel490
d) and expansion of ~os is stopped. Eventually, the imitator imitates the shorter491
path, as shown in fig. 5c.492
6 Discussion493
Selective and rational imitation shown by children would be a beneficial capac-494
ity for robots (Gergely, 2003). Unfortunately, no computationally explicit model495
of rational imitation in infants is available. In this paper, we have presented a496
formalization that captures the most relevant aspects of the behaviour of infants497
in experiments. The CDM can be considered as a formalized version of the teleo-498
logical reasoning hypothesis, which is underspecified (See Zmyj and Buttelmann,499
2014, for references). As such, the CDM is explicit enough to be implemented on500
robots, as demonstrated above.501
While our model is primarily conceived as a practical method for support-502
ing rational imitation in robots, it can also be evaluated for its ability to explain503
infant behavior. Considering the CDM as a psychological model of rational imi-504
tation in infants allows making a number of predictions. First, the CDM predicts505
that the surface structure of the observed action is not important in determining506
whether the action will be imitated by infants. Observed actions that have sim-507
ilar associated predicted costs, Eˆ(~ot), will induce similar levels of imitation. Ex-508
perimental work, using paradigms akin to those used to evaluate over-imitation509
(Lyons et al., 2007; Keupp et al., 2013), could test this prediction. These ex-510
periments use arbitrary complex action sequences and evaluate the extent to511
which they are copied by the child. According to the CDM, changing the order512
of the actions in a sequence should not influence the level of imitation. A sec-513
ond prediction that follows from our model is that the sign of the cost difference,514
Eˆ(~ot)−Eˆ(~at), does not influence the level of imitation. Indeed, we postulated that515
only the absolute value of the difference is taken into account in calculating ∆E.516
Therefore, the CDM predicts that both actions that are more costly and more effi-517
cient than the current strategy known to infants should lead to imitation. Again,518
this is a testable prediction of the CDM. A third prediction of the CDM is that519
the two previous predictions can be modulated by targeted manipulations of the520
saliency of parts of the action sequences used.521
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Figure 6: The values of ∆E as function of the number of selected states in ~os for
the four conditions in experiment 1.
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Figure 7: Plot illustrating the path planning algorithm used by the robots. The
plot depicts a hypothetical arena featuring 4 obstacles. The path planning algo-
rithm overlay the arena with a graph of closely nodes spaces. The path planning
algorithm searches for the shortest path of graph nodes between (1) the node
closest to the current position of the robot and (2) the node closest to the goal
position. Nodes that are too close near an obstacle are removed from the network
to force the path planning to steer clear of obstacles.
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